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 I propose to defend and explore three claims in this lecture.  First, there is very little actual “law” 
in federal constitutional law in the United States, especially with respect to cases that end up at the U.S. 
Supreme Court: there, the Court operates as a kind of super-legislature, albeit one with a limited 
jurisdiction, essentially making decisions based on the moral and political values of the justices, and not 
on the basis of legally binding standards.  This is, in part, a jurisprudential thesis about what counts as 
“legally binding standards,” one that I shall defend by reference to the most plausible account of the 
nature of law, the legal positivist theory developed by H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz.  Second, the absence 
of law in so many parts of federal constitutional law means that the quality of moral and political 
judgment exercised by judges is of decisive importance in how they fulfill their role and thus should be 
the overriding factor in the appointment of federal appellate judges, especially Supreme Court Justices.  
That brings me to my third claim, namely, that all political actors know that the U.S. Supreme Court 
often operates as a super-legislature, and thus that the moral and political views of the Justices are 
decisive criteria for their appointment.  This almost banal truth is, however, rarely discussed in the 
public confirmation process, but is common knowledge among political and legal insiders.  To be sure 
there is media speculation about the political predilections of the nominees, but their actual moral and 
political views are treated as off limits in the real confirmation process.  This anti-democratic secrecy is, 
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in my view, deeply wrong and must be replaced with a realistic acknowledgment of the role of the 
Supreme Court as a political actor of limited jurisdiction.  I will illustrate these claims by discussing a 
number of important public law cases, recent and not-so-recent. 
 What does it mean to say there is very little “law” in American constitutional law?  That requires 
us to have some view about what it means to say law exists, and so I must begin with some discussion of 
basic jurisprudential questions.  I will here follow the most promising theory about the nature of law, 
the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart and his student Joseph Raz.1  Let us start with some terminology.  
Human societies are awash in norms, by which I mean demands of the form, “You ought to do X” or 
“You ought not do Y.”2  Some norms are merely norms of etiquette: for example, “You ought not talk on 
your cell phone during the lecture” or “You ought not talk with your mouth full at the table.”  Others are 
norms of prudence or self-interest: “You ought to attend class, lest you fail the exam!”  Some are moral 
norms: “You ought to consider how your actions will affect the well-being of others.”  And some are 
norms of the legal system, for example, “You ought not go faster than 55 mph on the highway.”  The 
categories are not mutually exclusive: sometimes moral norms (e.g., “You ought not murder innocents”) 
are also legal norms, and sometimes norms of prudence are too (e.g., “You must wear a seatbelt while 
driving”).  Norms of etiquette are rarely legal norms, many moral norms are not legal ones, and many 
legal norms are not ones we think of as representing moral or ethical obligations (we don’t think the 
English are immoral for driving on the left rather than the right, but we recognize they have a legal 
obligation to do so).  The jurisprudential question is: how do we mark the difference?  And the legal 
positivist answer is: norms are legally valid—that is, norms of the legal system—in virtue of satisfying 
criteria in that system’s “rule of recognition” as Hart called it.  A rule of recognition specifies the criteria 
                                                          
1On legal positivism, see Brian Leiter, The Case for Legal Positivism as an Account of the Artefact Law, in 
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in virtue of which particular norms are taken to be norms of the legal system.  Such criteria can include 
legislative enactment, executive orders, judicial decisions, and so on. 
Rules of recognition in modern legal systems are, admittedly, complex.  Consider: a norm is a 
valid norm of the California legal system if it has been enacted by the California legislature and signed by 
the Governor, and has not been deemed unconstitutional as a matter of state or federal law by a state 
or federal court and has not been preempted by a constitutional federal law; a norm can also be a valid 
norm in the California system if it has been enacted by the U.S. Congress and signed by the President, 
and has not been deemed unconstitutional by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit or by the U.S. 
Supreme Court; a norm can also be a legally valid norm in the California legal system if it figures in the 
holding of a California court that has not been reversed by a higher California or federal court; and so 
on.  This omits executive orders and administrative rulings, also subject to various kinds of judicial 
review. 
 A good part of legal education is education in the rule of recognition of one’s legal system, 
although it is rarely denominated as such in the law school classroom.  But what makes it the case that 
California’s rule of recognition is what it is?  H.L.A. Hart’s great insight was that, at bottom, legal systems 
rest upon nothing more than a conventional practice of officials, notably judges.  The California 
Constitution is a binding norm of the California legal system only because judges in California treat it as 
binding on their decisions; so too with the Federal Constitution, and so too with legislative enactments, 
administrative decisions and the like.  That a rule of recognition exists, and that it has the particular 
content it does, depends entirely on officials converging on certain criteria of legal validity and on their 
treating such criteria as obligatory or binding—accepting them from an “internal point of view” as Hart 
famously said. That they converge on certain criteria is an empirical question, manifest in their decisions 
and sometimes the reasons given for them; that they treat such criteria as obligatory is manifest in their 
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language and their behavior: for example, in their willingness to criticize other judges who depart from 
those criteria, and in the language they use to justify their own conduct. 
 A wonderful example of Hart’s point comes from the case of Chief Judge Roy Moore of the 
Alabama Supreme Court, who in 2003 refused to abide by a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
11th Circuit that the presence of a statue of the Ten Commandments in the Alabama Supreme Court 
building violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.3  There was no doubt that under the 
applicable rule of recognition, the 11th Circuit had authority over Judge Moore with regard to the 
constitutionality of the placement of that statue.  And when Judge Moore defied the 11th Circuit’s 
decision, the officials of the Alabama legal system made manifest their acceptance of this aspect of the 
rule of recognition from an internal point of view: they not only criticized Judge Moore’s refusal to 
comply with the order, they convened the necessary procedures to remove him from office.  (Moore 
was subsequently reelected, which, alas, says more about the Alabama electorate, than about the 
officials of the legal system, who acted appropriately.) 
 We may imagine a more fanciful example to illustrate Hart’s view that where a rule of 
recognition exists, officials of the system accept that rule from an internal point of view, that is, they 
treat it as obligatory.  Suppose Chief Justice Roberts comes to Hastings, and a student asks, “Justice 
Roberts, why are you and the other Justices always worried about whether laws are constitutional?  I 
mean, who cares?  Why not just make a sensible decision?”  Once he gets past being surprised, the Chief 
Justice, we can be sure, would not give the following answer: “I’ll tell you why we’re always talking 
about the Constitution: being Chief Justice is a great job, it’s got prestige, lifetime tenure, a great 
pension too.  If I didn’t treat the Constitution as a constraint on what we do, I’m worried I’d get 
impeached and have to give up this wonderful sinecure I have.”  Instead of averting to crass self-
interested reasons like these for taking the Constitution seriously, the Chief Justice is far more likely to 
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appeal to the professional oath of office he took as a Justice to uphold the Constitution, as well as to the 
moral and political virtues of our Constitutional system as he understands them.  I want to be clear: I am 
quite sure those are the actual reasons the Chief Justice, like other justices and judges, take the 
constitutionality of statutes seriously.  Where legal systems exist, officials of the system, including the 
judges, really do accept the criteria of legal validity, such as constitutionality, from an internal point of 
view. 
 But this now brings us back to the problem with which we started.  Constitutionality is only a 
criterion of legal validity in the rule of recognition of the American legal system if judges generally treat 
it as such and accept it from an internal point of view.  The difficulty is that, while all judges treat the 
constitutional document as legally binding, they differ wildly on how to ascertain the meaning of its 
provisions.  Justice Scalia thinks the original public meaning of the provisions of the Constitution 
determines its requirements; Justice Thomas sometimes agrees with him, but no one else does.4  As a 
matter of the rule of recognition of American constitutional law, it is obviously false that the original 
public meaning of the Constitution is what is legally binding on the courts5: some judges treat the plain 
meaning as binding, some appeal to the structure of the Constitution, and almost all defer to past 
judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions (whether based on original meaning or not) as 
binding, an example of what my colleague David Strauss calls our “constitutional common law.”6 Since 
federal judges do not converge on a single way of fixing constitutional meaning, it follows, on the 
                                                          
4Other judges will avert to originalist considerations, but do not regard them as decisive the way Justice 
Scalia purports to do. 
5Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist 
Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107 (2008). 
6See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).  In the 
lower federal courts, something like the “common law constitutionalism” approach dominates, due to 
convergence among officials on the binding force of Supreme Court decisions.  But even there there remains 
plenty of room for the exercise of quasi-legislative powers. 
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positivist view, that in large parts of so-called “constitutional law” there really is no law because there 
are no criteria of legal validity generally accepted and applied by judges.7 
 Not all areas of what we call constitutional law are so unsettled—unanimous decisions by the 
Supreme Court on many constitutional issues are rather good evidence in support of that point.  But 
even divided decisions can turn out to be.  Let us recall the 1989 case Texas v. Johnson,8 in which the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided that a law prohibiting desecration of the flag violated the First Amendment, 
a decision in which Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined the majority opinion by Justice Brennan.  Twenty-
five years later, the case stands as good law: the government cannot, constitutionally, punish burning 
the American flag.  Lower court judges understand that a Supreme Court decision like Texas v. Johnson 
binds them to invalidate any blanket ban on flag-burning, and thus the issue has hardly arisen since. 
 Then, however, we have an issue like whether the Second Amendment protects an individual 
right to own guns.  For most of the twentieth-century, it was settled law that it does not; after all the 
Amendment reads, “A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”  One natural reading, one that dominated for 
most of our constitutional history, was that this protected the right of states to arm their militias.  That 
the Amendment really protects an individual right to bear arms was famously deemed a “fraud on the 
American public” by the late Chief Justice Warren Burger, a Republican appointee.9  The “fraud” is now 
the law of the land, thanks to the decision in 2008 by the super-legislature in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, which bypassed precedent and received wisdom in favor of the original public meaning as read 
by Justice Scalia in the majority and disputed at length by Justice Stevens in the dissent.10  The historical 
                                                          
7This extends beyond constitutional law in some measure in the U.S.  See the discussion in Brian Leiter, 
Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1224–32 (2009). 
8Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
9The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: First Freedoms (PBS television broadcast Dec. 16, 1991). 
10District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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evidence is obviously mixed, and my colleague Judge Richard Posner’s verdict on the decision, in a well-
known New Republic article at the time,11 still seems apt: 
Lawyers are advocates for their clients, and judges are advocates for whichever side of the case 
they have decided to vote for.  The judge sends his law clerks scurrying to the library and to the 
Web for bits and pieces of historical documentation.  When the clerks are the numerous and 
able clerks of Supreme Court justices, enjoying the assistance of the capable staffs of the 
Supreme Court library and the Library of Congress, and when dozens and sometimes hundreds 
of amicus curiae briefs have been filed, many bulked out with the fruits of their authors' own 
law-office historiography, it is a simple matter, especially for a skillful rhetorician such as Scalia, 
to write a plausible historical defense of his position. 
But it was not so simple in Heller, and Scalia and his staff labored mightily to produce a long 
opinion (the majority opinion is almost 25,000 words long) that would convince, or perhaps just 
overwhelm, the doubters.  The range of historical references in the majority opinion is 
breathtaking, but it is not evidence of disinterested historical inquiry.  It is evidence of the ability 
of well-staffed courts to produce snow jobs. 
. . . . 
. . . . For more than two centuries, the "right" to private possession of guns, supposedly created 
by the Second Amendment, had lain dormant.  Constitutional rights often lie dormant, spectral 
subjects of theoretical speculation, until some change in the social environment creates a 
demand for their vivification and enforcement.  But nothing has changed in the social 
environment to justify giving the Second Amendment a new life discontinuous with its old one: a 
                                                          
11Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books/defense-looseness. 
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new wine in a decidedly old wineskin.  There is no greater urgency about allowing people to 
possess guns for self-defense or defense of property today than there was thirty years ago, 
when the prevalence of violent crime was greater, or for that matter one hundred years ago.  
Only the membership of the Supreme Court has changed. 
If constitutional decisions are to be determined by the balance between liberals and 
conservatives on the Supreme Court, the fig-leafing that we find in Heller--the historicizing glaze 
on personal values and policy preferences--will continue to be irresistibly tempting to the 
justices, with their large and tireless staffs and their commitment to a mystique of "objective" 
interpretation.  There is no way to purge political principles from constitutional decision-making, 
but they do not have to be liberal or conservative principles.  A preference for judicial modesty--
for less interference by the Supreme Court with the other branches of government--cannot be 
derived by some logical process from constitutional text or history.  It would have to be 
imposed.  It would be a discretionary choice by the justices.  But judging from Heller, it would be 
a wise choice.  It would go some distance toward de-politicizing the Supreme Court.  It would 
lower the temperature of judicial confirmation hearings, widen the field of selection of justices, 
and enable the Supreme Court to attend to the many important non-constitutional issues that it 
is inclined to neglect. 
A preference for judicial modesty is, however, also a political choice,12 as Judge Posner recognizes, one 
that will serve to immunize from judicial review whatever the prevailing ideology of the other branches 
of the government is at that time.  So the real question is why, when we confirm Justices to the super-
                                                          
12There is ambiguity in the notion of a “political” choice, though the basic idea is that it is a choice 
motivated by adherence to a norm that has no legal status but instead reflects commitments for how the polity as 
a whole should be organized—such norms may run the gamut from partisanship for the narrow agenda of a 
particular party to a vision of the just society.     
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legislature, why do we not have a public discussion of their political principles?  That is the question 
Judge Posner’s apt critique raises. 
 The Supreme Court’s role as super-legislature emerges in the recent voting rights case, Shelby 
County v. Holder (2013).13  Here a bare majority of the super-legislature invalidated Section 4 of the 
Voting Rights Act that the actual legislature, that is, the United States Congress, had evaluated and 
extended in 2006.14  The Shelby decision did so based on the finding of five members of the super-
legislature that Section 4—which specified the formula for determining which states with a history of 
voting discrimination required federal pre-approval for election law changes—is no longer necessary, 
contrary to the view, apparently, of the actual legislature seven years earlier.  In an opinion by Chief 
Justice Roberts, the five super-legislators explained that while, “Congress compiled thousands of pages 
of evidence before reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act,” these did not justify the original 1965 formula 
for pre-clearance.15  Why not?  According to Chief Justice Roberts, there was “no logical relation” to the 
Section 4 requirements, that these requirements are “irrational” given the record, indeed, “played no 
role” in the pre-clearance formulas.16  This is all just rhetorical flourish, of course, for a different 
legislative judgment: it is obviously not irrational to rectify a wrong with a possibly overinclusive 
measure when the wrong is sufficiently serious that one wants to secure its elimination.  As Justice 
Ginsburg, for the dissenters, observed: 
Congress determined, based on a voluminous record, that the scourge of discrimination was not 
yet extirpated.  The question this case presents is who decides whether, as currently operative, 
[pre-clearance in accordance with the Section 4 formula] remains justifiable, this Court, or a 
Congress charged with the obligation to enforce the post-Civil War Amendments “by 
                                                          
13Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
14Note that the fundamental question in Shelby County was a constitutional, not statutory one: namely, 
was Section 4 a constitutional (i.e., rational) exercise of Congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction 
Amendments, i.e., the 14th and 15th Amendments, to the U.S. Constitution? 
15Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2629. 
16Id. at 2629, 2630–31. 
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appropriate legislation.”  With overwhelming support in both Houses, Congress concluded that, 
for two prime reasons, [the preclearance formula] should continue in force, unabated.  First, 
continuance would facilitate completion of the impressive gains thus far made; and second, 
continuance would guard against backsliding.  Those assessments were well within Congress’ 
province to make and should elicit this Court’s unstinting approbation.17 
Alas, a majority of the super-legislature did not offer approbation to the actual legislature’s assessment, 
instead substituting its judgment on the policy merits for Congress’s.  If Shelby County were anomalous, 
this might not be notable, but the point is that it is fairly typical of what happens in the public law 
domain. 
 The problem is exacerbated, of course, because the U.S. Supreme Court selects its docket—it 
picks the cases it wants to hear, and unsurprisingly it picks the cases where the federal circuits conflict 
or where the law is up for grabs, up for grabs in precisely the sense that the rule of recognition does not 
clearly settle what should be done.  Of course, the Supreme Court, having claimed for itself—without 
any basis in the constitutional text—final authority to adjudicate constitutional questions two centuries 
ago in Marbury18 (one of the more successful revisions of the American rule of recognition in our 
history) sometimes takes cases that might appear to be settled, a clear indication that the Court intends 
to exercise its super-legislative authority.  Recall New York v. United States from 1992,19 one of the early 
cases20 that signalled the intent of some members of the super-legislature to redraw the boundaries of 
federal power after an earlier super-legislature appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt redrew them 
in the late 1930s and early 1940s to make the New Deal possible.  New York concerned the Low–Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which the State of New York now challenged as 
                                                          
17Id. at 2632–33. 
18Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).   [Note on scholarly controversy about this—cf. Hamilton, 
Federalist 78, see also articles by Maiva Marcus, David Currie] 
19New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
20Earlier, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).  
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betraying federalism values by violating state autonomy.  Under what one might have thought the 
controlling precedent, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transportation Authority21 just seven years 
earlier, this should have been an “easy” case, i.e., one in which the law clearly dictated that New York 
lose.  Garcia, which concerned federal regulations about wages and working hours, held (or so it seemed 
at the time!) that the only protection for federalism values, like state autonomy, came from the political 
process itself, that is, from the fact that the states were all represented in Congress; only if there were a 
breakdown in the political process, so the Garcia court suggested, would the U.S. Supreme Court 
intervene.  New York v. United States was a clear case from the standpoint of Garcia: the Federal 
Radioactive Waste Management Act had been enacted by Congress after being drafted by the various 
states: the states, in effect, wanted Congress to bind them to the agreement they had reached among 
themselves.  This would seem to be a paradigmatic case of federalism values in action: autonomous 
states strike a bargain about how to dispose of their radioactive waste, and then ask Congress to enforce 
the bargain. 
 Once the super-legislature known as the Supreme Court granted cert in the matter everyone 
was on notice, of course, that the super-legislature planned to act.  And act it did: in its majority opinion, 
Justice O’Connor took a page from the great American Legal Realist Karl Llewellyn’s explanation of the 
malleability of precedent from his 1930 book The Bramble Bush.22  In Llewellyn’s famous rendering, 
appellate courts approach precedents in one of two ways: they read “unwelcome” precedents strictly, 
that is, they characterize their holding in a way that is highly specific to the facts of the earlier case in 
order to distinguish it from the case currently before the court.  In Llewellyn’s obviously facetious 
example, a strict reading of an earlier court’s holding might be, “This rule holds only of redheaded 
Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars.”23  By contrast, a “loose” reading of a precedent abstracts away 
                                                          
21Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
22KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 68–71 (11th prtg. 2008). 
23Id. at 68. 
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from the particular facts of the case in favor of a generic rule of law that the court would like to treat as 
binding in the present instance.  Not every “strict” or “loose” reading is going to be plausible, but 
Llewellyn, as the smart and experienced lawyer he was, is plainly correct that the doctrine of precedent 
affords courts enough latitude in construing the holdings of earlier cases to make precedent a feeble 
constraint on present decision in many cases.  And that is precisely what happened in New York v. 
United States. 
 Justice O’Connor, in the majority opinion, faced an obvious problem as I mentioned: under 
Garcia, the Federal Radioactive Waste Act looked like a clear case of the political process operating to 
protect the interests of the states—after all, the states had drafted the Act in negotiations with each 
other, and then asked Congress to enact it.  Presumably O’Connor lacked the votes to overrule Garcia—
a move that would have been unseemly, in any case, given that Garcia had overruled another case, 
National League of Cities,24 from less than a decade before!—and so, taking a page from Llewellyn, she 
set out to distinguish Garcia by reading it strictly.  According to Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion,25 
the rule in Garcia—the rule that the only protection for federalism values comes from the political 
process itself—applies only in cases where the federal regulation applies to both public and private 
entities, as was true of the wage and hour regulations at issue in Garcia.  Garcia itself did not make an 
issue out of this, but now, seven years later in New York, Justice O’Connor did: for the Federal 
Radioactive Waste Management Act applied only to public entities, namely states, and so according to 
Justice O’Connor presented a different issue than in Garcia.  With Garcia distinguished, Justice O’Connor 
proceeded into an historical analysis and ultimately invalidated a portion of the Act.  Those details do 
not matter for our purposes. 
                                                          
24Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
25New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149–88 (1992). 
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 The dissenting opinion by Justice White26 also took a page from Llewellyn: he effectively accused 
the majority of distinguishing Garcia on the basis of factual differences that did not make a difference—
in effect, Justice White complained, the majority opinion said the rule in Garcia applies only to 
“redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars.”27  From Justice White’s perspective, the difference 
between a federal regulation that reached public and private entities as opposed to only public ones 
was irrelevant, New York v. United States was an easy case, and Garcia should have controlled the 
result. 
 I want to be clear that I do not think either majority or dissent was right “as a matter of law” in 
this case.  Justice O’Connor did a poor job, to be sure, of explaining why the factual difference between 
Garcia and New York actually mattered, but an explanation is not hard to come by: surely it is not crazy 
to think state autonomy might be more at risk when a federal regulation only applies to the states, as 
opposed to regulating public and private actors equally.  At the same time, Justice White’s view was 
equally plausible as a matter of law: the Garcia rule emphasized the importance of the political process 
as a safeguard for state autonomy, and the underlying facts in New York seemed to indicate a political 
process functioning well, indeed, driven by the states themselves, until the state of New York had some 
buyer’s remorse. 
 If the preceding is correct, then we should ask what really happened in New York v. United 
States?  New York, as students of federalism know, was near the beginning of a series of Supreme Court 
cases in which, for the first time since the triumph of the New Deal, the Court began placing some limits 
on the exercise of federal power.  President Reagan, who appointed Justice O’Connor a decade earlier, 
ran partly on this issue, the issue of state autonomy from federal overreach.  And so for Justice 
O’Connor, a new-fangled conservative in the Reagan mold, New York presented an opportunity to state 
loud and clear that there really are limits on federal power.  By contrast, for Justice White, an old-
                                                          
26Id. at 188–211. 
27LLEWELLYN, supra note 22, at 68. 
14 
 
fangled conservative, appointed by President Kennedy in the early 1960s, the New Deal revolution had 
settled all the questions about the scope of federal power; Justice White was a law-and-order 
conservative, skeptical of the expanding rights of criminal defendants, as well as of abortion rights, but 
he was fully accepting of the transformation of the constitutional system effected by the New Deal.  The 
federal legislature voted to bind the states to a proposal for disposing radioactive waste that they 
themselves had drafted; in New York v. United States, the super-legislature known as the Supreme Court 
voted to overturn part of that plan.  In doing so, they did not act as the law requires: only a naif could 
believe that.  Instead, they exercised moral and political judgment and acted accordingly. 
 Let us now fast forward to the present, last term’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014).28  
In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court upheld a challenge by closely held corporations to a requirement of 
the Affordable Care Act—more precisely, the mandate imposed by the Department of Health & Human 
Services under that Act—that employers (of a certain size) pay for employee health insurance that 
covers, among other things, four kinds of (allegedly) post-conception contraceptive drugs and devices.  
The challenge was based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a 1993 law which attempted 
to restore the constitutional protections for “free exercise” of religion that had existed prior to Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith.29  That 1990 decision held that the state need 
not grant religious exemptions for neutral laws of general applicability—neutral in the sense that their 
purpose was not (facially or otherwise) to substantially burden a particular religious faith.  Thus, under 
Smith, the federal government did not need to find a less burdensome alternative to a law that imposed 
incidental but substantial burdens on free exercise of religion. 
The Hobby Lobby decision found, plausibly, that the owners of the closely held corporations 
challenging the mandate genuinely believed that life begins at conception, so that they genuinely 
                                                          
28Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
29Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). [BL add discussion of 
RFRA history, now applies only to feds]  
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believed that post-conception contraception was akin to murder.30  I want to emphasize that three 
aspects of the Hobby Lobby decision seem to me fairly banal, given the existence of RFRA: first, that the 
free exercise of religion of a closely held corporation is not meaningfully distinguishable from the free 
exercise of religion by the individuals who closely own the corporation (in other words, closely held 
corporations are “persons” for purposes of RFRA); second, that since the federal government had 
already provided an opt-out provision from the mandate for non-profit entities with religious objections 
(like the University of Notre Dame), one that did not shift costs to the employees seeking contraceptive 
coverage, then it was clear that there were regulatory alternatives available to the federal government 
to insure that contraception was available to female employees that did not impose a substantial 
burden on religious belief; and third, that under our constitutional regime of religious liberty, courts 
must take seriously someone’s religious belief that life begins at conception.  I, myself, disagree with this 
latter aspect of our constitutional system, just as I also think RFRA is a bad law,31 but that is not at issue 
in my doubts about Hobby Lobby.  My doubts lie elsewhere. 
 The crucial legal question presented in Hobby Lobby, granting the points I have just conceded, is 
whether requiring a closely held corporation to pay for health insurance that an employee might use to 
access medical services of which her employer disapproves constitutes a “substantial burden” on the 
free exercise of the employer’s religion in a society which is not a theocracy, that is, in a society in 
which, for example, employees need not subscribe to the religion of their employers.  The idea that it 
would constitute a substantial burden ought to have seemed preposterous on its face.  Yet in the 
majority opinion of the super-legislature by Justice Alito, we are told that the belief of the owners of the 
closely held corporations that their paying for insurance which their employees could use to secure 
contraceptive services of which their employers disapprove “implicates a difficult and important 
question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong for a 
                                                          
30Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–65, 2766, 2775. 
31See BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013). 
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person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the 
commission of an immoral act by another.”32  It is not for the courts, Justice Alito asserts, to tell “the 
plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed.”33  The job of the courts is only to determine whether the beliefs 
are sincere religious beliefs, which everyone, including me, grants that they are. 
 This sounds reasonable until one considers a scenario in which the religious plaintiffs profess the 
following putatively religious belief: “This law substantially burdens our free exercise of religion.”  That 
looks rather like a legal conclusion masquerading as a religious belief, but now we need to ask how such 
a scenario is any different from the position of the challengers in Hobby Lobby?  If you believe that 
paying for medical insurance that can be used by your employees to access medical procedures of which 
you disapprove violates your free exercise rights, that’s a legal question for the courts: the courts can 
grant that you really believe this, indeed, that you hold a particular philosophical or religious view about 
“the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but 
that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another.”  But calling 
it a “philosophical” or religious view does not change the fact that it states a legal conclusion, namely, 
that the law requiring you to pay for the medical insurance substantially burdens your religion. 
 In short, we can agree with Justice Alito that the Supreme Court has long held that it will not 
adjudicate whether religious beliefs are sensible, only whether they are religious and sincerely held.  But 
that does not mean that the courts must defer to the religious person’s beliefs about whether the law 
substantially burdens their religion: that has to be a legal question for the courts, or the courts are out 
of business.  The super-legislature should have acted like an actual court and found there was no 
“substantial burden” on Hobby Lobby.34 
                                                          
32Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778. 
33Id. 
34Justice Ginsburg makes this point in dissent. Id. at 2798. 
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It is important to notice that the mistake in Justice Alito’s reasoning was, in fact, a legal mistake, 
not in the sense that he failed to recognize the relevant sources of law but in the sense that he failed to 
understand the conceptual or logical entailments from those sources.  More precisely, Justice Alito 
failed to correctly distinguish the legal question whether a particular law actually imposes a “substantial 
burden” on religious exercise from the non-legal question that courts are not supposed to adjudicate, 
namely, whether claimant’s religious beliefs are reasonable.  If it were really the case that courts must 
defer to claimant’s allegedly religious beliefs about substantial burdens—that is, about whether their 
legal rights are violated—then there is nothing for the courts to do.  Since that is absurd, Justice Alito 
obviously made a serious mistake in his legal reasoning. 
 Even if the super-legislature’s mistake in Hobby Lobby was a legal mistake, it still calls attention 
again to the importance of moral and political judgment by the members of this super-legislature, since 
their moral and political values may explain their propensity to make certain kinds of mistakes.  
Remember that the Supreme Court, two hundred years ago in Marbury v. Madison, successfully claimed 
for itself the power to settle constitutional questions, meaning that the actual legislature cannot easily 
undo the mistakes that are motivated by the moral and political beliefs of the Justices—in this case, the 
desire of the conservative majority of the super-legislature to signal their fundamental sympathy with 
religious conservatives.  To be sure, Hobby Lobby concerns RFRA, not the First Amendment, though 
RFRA was, in part, purporting to re-establish an earlier constitutional regime. 35 But it is a reasonable 
prediction that Congress will not revisit RFRA to undo the Hobby Lobby decision.  Thus, even the plain 
legal mistakes of the super-legislature give us further reason to want to know the moral and political 
views of the Justices before they are appointed, since those views will illuminate precisely the domains 
in which they are likely to make errors. 
                                                          
35[as Hobby Lobby court notes, RFRA perhaps go beyond it as well]  
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 Alas, the only people who are led to believe that Supreme Court Justices are appointed based 
simply on their legal skill and knowledge are the American people, i.e., the electorate.36  Every American 
President, from at least Roosevelt to Reagan to the present, understands that the U.S. Supreme Court 
often acts as a super-legislature, and therefore one had better try to appoint legislators, that is Justices, 
who share the moral and political views of the appointing President.  Let me share an amusing, but 
revealing, story my colleague, Judge Richard Posner, told me, and which he has shared with many others 
so I am not betraying any secrets here.  Posner was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in 1981 when, as he has said to my jurisprudence class one year, people didn’t realize 
Reagan was “stacking” the courts with “right-wingers like me.”  Those are Judge Posner’s words, though 
as all lawyers know, he has proven to be far less of a right-winger than the current Republican Party 
might have hoped.  In any case, Judge Posner’s point was that the media did not pay much attention to 
Senate confirmation hearings then.  Posner’s hearing was presided over by Senator Strom Thurmond of 
South Carolina, even then (in the early 1980s) a nearly octogenarian segregationist trying to pass as a 
member of the modern world.  Senator Thurmond, reading from his prepared script, asked, “Mr. Posner, 
if appointed to the Court, will you regard it as your obligation to apply the law as written rather than 
make new law?”  Posner, being a smart lawyer and scholar, explained that the choice was a false one: 
appellate courts are repeatedly asked to decide cases in which the law is not settled—that is one reason 
the cases are litigated through the stage of appellate review, after all—and in those cases, the courts 
must provide authoritative resolution, essential to a civilized society.  So, of course, appellate judges 
must sometimes make new law, since no legislature—as H.L.A. Hart observed a half-century ago—could 
                                                          
36The public is not wholly ignorant, to be sure.  A CBS News poll in 2012 found that three quarters of 
Americans believe that Supreme Court justices “sometimes let their personal or political views influence their 
decisions.”  See http://www.pollingreport.com/court.htm.  The Public Religion Institute in 2013 found that 55% of 
those surveyed thought Supreme Court Justices were influenced by their own political views “a lot, while 32% 
though they were influneced only “a little,” and 8% “not at all.”  Despite these suspicions, when Supreme Court 
Justices are confirmed in public by the Senate, inquiry into their personal or political views is treated as off-limits.  
(Thanks to Mike Seidman for help on this topic.) 
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possibly anticipate all the problems that will arise.  In other words, appellate judges must exercise moral 
and political judgment, an unavoidable part of their job.  Senator Thurmond, already well into his 
dotage, did not respond to the actual answer, but moved on to the next question in his script.  Now we 
come to the punchline of this curious story: when Judge Posner received the transcript of his 
confirmation hearing several weeks later, Senator Thurmond’s initial question was correctly recorded, 
namely, “Mr. Posner, if appointed to the Court, will you regard it as your obligation to apply the law as 
written rather than make new law?”  But instead of Posner’s actual answer, the transcript read that 
Posner simply replied, “Yes.” 
 Now this is America in 1981, not Stalinist Russia, yet a federal judicial nominee’s actual answer 
to a silly question by a political hack was erased from the historical record in order to comport with the 
political agenda of a President—Ronald Reagan—who liked to claim that he only wanted to appoint 
judges who apply the law, rather than make the law.  But Reagan and his advisors knew this was 
nonsense, just like Judge Posner: they knew that appellate judges must inevitably exercise moral and 
political judgment beyond the issues settled by the law in order to resolve the actual disputes that come 
before the appellate courts.  How, in a democratic society, can such secrecy be justified? 
 In my view, it cannot.  We should tell the truth to the electorate: law makers cannot anticipate 
all problems that will arise, but in a civilized society, we need courts to provide authoritative resolutions 
of disputes which are left unsettled by the existing sources of law.  Courts play that role, and the 
“higher” the court, the more likely it is that court will be asked to exercise circumscribed moral and 
political judgment, akin to what we expect from honest legislators, assuming that term is not an 
oxymoron in America these days.  Therefore, when such judges are to be appointed, the nominal 
representatives of the people should evaluate the quality of moral and political judgment the nominee 
would exercise.  Will the nominee reflexively side with markets against state regulation, with majorities 
against minorities, with the religious against the non-religious, with color-blindness against sensitivity to 
20 
 
the pernicious role of race in society, with the police against criminal defendants, with the current 
ideological fixations of the Republican Party against the current ideological fixations of the Democratic 
Party?  Is the nominee sensitive to injustice, to the powerless, to the losers in the political process, or 
does he or she side reflexively with those in power, with the status quo?  These questions should be 
central to the confirmation process of members of the super-legislature—or rather, they should be 
central in public to that process, since they are obviously central to the actual nominators.  They are 
also, to be sure, the subject of speculation, rumors and gossip, but that is not the same as making them 
central to the actual proceedings in which the Senate confirms a nominee.  There are, certainly, many 
issues in which legal expertise is essential, but there is no shortage of candidates with the requisite 
expertise to parse technical points of law and it is rare indeed that a President puts forward a candidate 
for the super-legislature lacking that competence.  What is not rare, unfortunately, is for Presidents to 
put forward candidates for the super-legislature whom they choose based on their moral and political 
views, but then fail to acknowledge that fact to the rest of the polity, indeed, to object when the Senate 
even asks about those views. 
 There is, one must acknowledge, a genuine worry about encouraging candor on these matters.  
The worry, simply put, is that it will embolden judges to overreach the legal limits even more than they 
already do.  Perhaps so, but the status quo is that elected officials appoint super-legislators because of 
their moral and political views, but no one is permitted to discuss that fact in public.  If, in fact, we had a 
public discussion of what all the insiders know—namely, that appellate judges at the highest levels must 
exercise moral and political judgment—then perhaps those judges who actually survive the process will 
be those whose moral and political judgments comport more closely with those of the polity at large?37  
A polity that might welcome a liberal one decade might not welcome her a decade later, and so that is 
                                                          
37I assume, for the sake of argument here, that majority approval suffices to “legitimate” the moral and 
political views of the judges.  For independent reasons, this strikes me as dubious, but that would require a 
separate argument. 
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yet another reason to abolish lifetime tenure for federal judges in favor of fixed term appointments, as 
other scholars have proposed.38  But even before that happens, I do not see how in a democratic society 
where transparency in the exercise of public power (outside a select realm of areas, such as national 
security) is a fundamental value we can continue to tolerate the current charade of nominating lawyers 
to the United States Supreme Court without vetting, fully and in public, their moral and political views 
which will determine their decisions in a range of momentous constitutional matters, and sometimes 
not only there. 
                                                          
38See, e.g., REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. 
Carrington eds., 2006); Letter from Paul Carrington, Professor, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, et al. to Vice President 
Joseph Biden et al. (Feb. 2009) (available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/02/groups-proposals-for-supreme-
court-reform). 
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